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THE MISAPPLICATION OF ANTITRUST
THEORY TO PATENT LICENSE CONDITIONS*
THEODORE L. BowEst
INTRODUCTION
0 VER THE past few years, there has been wide debate over patent license
law, the law regarding the conditions patent owners can legally impose
on licensees or the permissible scope of license grants. The controversy came
to a head in 1970 when Senator Scott of Pennsylvania introduced amend-
ments' to a then-pending bill intended to revise the patent laws.2 According
to the Senator, the amendments were intended to stabilize and codify license
law. The amendments were rejected in the subcommittee and the bill was
not enacted.
The history which led to the proposals for codification is a long one
of gradual, case-by-case loss of rights for patent owners. Prior to the second
decade of the twentieth century, conditions and restrictions of many kinds
were commonly included in patent licenses, and the courts consistently held
them valid. The Supreme Court's decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.' so
held, but it raised a warning to future licensors and licensees that rights
so broadly permitted might be in jeopardy. The minority in this 5-3 decision
would have invalidated the tie-in which served as the basis for the suit, and
ultimately the minority view of A. B. Dick prevailed in Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.," another tie-in situation. The reversal
*The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of any organiza-
tion or firm with which he is associated.
tExecutive Director, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.; Of Counsel, Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow and Garrett, Washington, D.C.; Former General Patent Council, Westinghouse
Electric Corp.; Former Chairman, ABA Section, Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law; B.S.
University of Illinois; LL.B. George Washington University.
IS. 2576 amend. 578, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
2 Title 35 of the United States Code. The last revision was enacted in 1952.
3 224 U.S. 1 (1912). The Supreme Court, per Lurton, J., stated:
The books abound in cases upholding the right of a patentee owner of a machine to
license another to use it, subject to any qualification in respect of time, place, manner
or purpose of use which the licensee agrees to accept. 224 U.S. at 18.
4243 U.S. 502 (1917).
5 A tie-in situation arises when the owner of a product, such as a mimeograph machine (the
tying product), sells that product only on the condition that the buyer purchases from him
the paper or ink (tied products) necessary to operate the machine. For a further explanation
and discussion of this concept, see E. KITNER, AN ANTrrRUST PRIMER 47, 55 (1973).
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was perhaps foretold in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell,6 where the Supreme Court
held that price restrictions were outside the scope of the patent.
In the sixty years following the Motion Picture case, a wide variety of
practices has been denied to patent owners. These include a number of
tie-in situations,7 charging of different royalty rates according to source of
material,' or geographic location,' licensee estoppel,"0 free cross licenses,"
grant backs,1 mutual agreements among distributors, 3 resale price pro-
visions," ' price restrictions in cross licensees,'" industry networks to stabilize
prices," compulsory package licensing," settlement of interferences with
cross-licenses,' 8 foreign patent pools,'9 post expiration royalties,2 ° and royalty
on an entire machine where the patent covered something less." Other
invasions of patent owners' established rights include in rem invalidity2 2
and federal preemption.2
8229 U.S. 1 (1913). The Court, in a 5-4 decision, found illegal resale price maintenance
in a patent case involving a license condition. This was the first case to place a restriction on
a patent owner's right to condition permission to infringe.
7Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (sale of unpatented
switches not contributory infringement); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488 (1942) (use of unpatented salt); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (purchase
of IBM tabulating cards); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)(purchase of unpatented dry ice); Lincoln Electric Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 171 F.2d223 (6th Cir. 1948) (license only purchase of articles that use method); American Lecithin
Co. v. Warfield Co., 23 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1938), affd, 105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939)(implied licenses).
8 Barber Asphalt Corp. v. LaFera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1940)
(different royalty according to source of material).
9 LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (different royalties in different geographic
areas).
10 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"1 United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
12 United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (grant back
in connection with a patent pool).
13 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
14 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
1" United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
16 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
17 American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1959).
18 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
19 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp' 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
20 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
21 Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971).
2 2 University of Ill. Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., 465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.
1972).
23 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.Stiffel Co., 376 1,.S, 225 (1964). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v, Bticron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974),
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It may be useful to roll back the pages of the casebooks to see whether
the courts have treated the patent right fairly or reasonably. This is a period
of history when it may be more important than ever to maximize every
incentive to improve technology - especially in high public interest areas
such as ecology and energy. Reward under the patent right is of crucial
importance in maximizing incentives to invent and invest.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
This study begins with the Button Fastener case."4 Although it has been
overruled,"5 the decision is based on sound, unrefuted reasoning. In Button
Fastener, the plaintiff sold machines used to fasten buttons to shoes on condi-
tion that they be used only with unpatented staples obtained from the
plaintiff. The defendant argued that the condition operated to create a mon-
opoly in unpatented staples and was, therefore, contrary to public policy,
or so unconscionable that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief. The Court
noted that there are limitations upon a patentee's power to contract. These
include restraints imposed by the police power and uses by those charged with
maintenance of public duties, such as telephone companies subject to regu-
lation by law. This principle was held inapplicable to the facts of the case.
The Court's reasoning reflects careful analysis:
If the patentee chooses to reserve to himself the exclusive use of his
device, and the invention be of a wide character, and so radical as to
enable him to make and sell an unpatentable product cheaper than any
other competitor, a practical monopoly of the market for that article
will result; and yet no one could say that a monopoly thus secured was
illegitimate, or obnoxious to public policy.... Now, if the patentees,
by retaining to themselves the exclusive use of their invention, are able,
legitimately and lawfully, to acquire a monopoly of the manufacture of
shoes, and destroy the shoe market for those who before had shared
it, why may they not, by a system of restricted licenses, permit others
to use their devices on condition that only some minor part of the
shoe, - the pegs, the tips, the thread, or the buttons, or the button
fasteners, - shall be bought from them? If these concessions were such
,.as to enable others to compete, though their use of the mechanism was
restricted by the terms of the license, who could justly complain, if
the inventors, content with a monopoly of the market for the article
named in their license, surrendered the opportunity for a monopoly of
the manufacture of the complete shoe? ... The monopoly in the un-
patented staple results as an incident from the monopoly in the use of
24 Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896)
[hereinafter cited as Button Fastener].
25 Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 US, 502 (1917) [hereinafter
cited as Motion Picture].
Slimmer, •1976]
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complainant's invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of the
patentee's control over the use of his invention by others. Depending,
as such a monopoly would, upon the merits of the invention to which it
is a mere incident, it is neither obnoxious to public policy, nor an illegal
restraint of trade.28
The Court's position can be summarized as follows:
(1) An exclusive market position, built up by exercising the exclusivity
of the patent right by manufacture and sale by the patentee for his own
account, is legitimate, even if his success destroys his competitors;
(2) If a sole position can then legally be developed, a patentee should
be allowed to permit others to use the invention with tie-in conditions;
(3) A tie-in provides a form of competition in the patented product;
there is no improper end-product monopoly, nor are providers of un-
patented components improperly or illegally excluded;
(4) Licensing on terms such that the profit results from sales of the
tied product is permissible and the tie-in acts as a counter by which
the royalty is proportioned to use; and,
(5) Any superior market position enjoyed by plaintiff is reached by
reason of the competitive superiority of the patented machine.
While this case was tried as an infringement case five years after passage of
the Sherman Act in 1890,27 that Act was not mentioned. Yet the opinion
discusses monopolies resulting from patents. It seems a fair inference that
this Circuit Court believed that there was a clear line between positions
developing out of patents and those where patents are not involved. This
seems to echo Senator Sherman himself who said that "a limited monopoly
secured by a patent right is an admitted exception, for this is the only way an
inventor can be paid for his invention."28
A few years later, another case was brought to recover damages for
the breach of a patent license, to restrain future breach, and to compel
specific performance. This was Bement v. National Harrow Co.,29 decided
early in 1902. The license was based on eighty-five patents relating to float
spring tooth harrows, frames, and attachments. Each licensee agreed:
(1) To pay a royalty for each harrow or frame sold except for those
exported, and to pay a much greater sum as damages for unlicensed
sales;
26 Button Fastener, 77 F. at 295-96.
2T Sherman Act §§-7, ch. 647, §§1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§1-7
(1955).
28 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (Remarks of Senator Sherman).
p8 186 U.S. 70 (1902) [hereinafter cited as Bement].
[Vol. 10:1
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(2) Not to ship on commission, allow rebates, or sell below the prices
fixed by the licensee or on more favorable terms than established
under the license contracts;
(3) Not to engage in manufacture or sale of products not licensed
except to other licensees;
(4) Not to contest validity; and,
(5) Not to re-design the licensed products or make or sell different
styles.
The plaintiff-patentee reserved the right to decrease the selling price of
products, to establish terms more favorable to purchasers, to reduce stated
royalties, and not to license others. Schedules identified the kinds of harrows
licensed and contained a statement of prices including permitted discounts.
The defendant brought the case within the Sherman Act by charging
that the various contracts were in violation of that Act. The Court made it
abundantly clear that it was not ignoring the Sherman Act. The opinion
notes that the only federal question raised is the validity of the various
contracts "with regard to the act of Congress on the subject of trusts."3 The
Bement Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall and established the importance
of the patent right for the Court. The quotation is important enough to be
quoted fully:
... It cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States
has ever been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful
inventions an exclusive right in their inventions for the time mentioned
in their patent. It is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by
the public for the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a
stimulus to those exertions. The laws which are passed to give effect
to this purpose ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which
they have been made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of
the United States, where the full benefit has been actually received: if
this can be done without transcending the intention of the statute, or
countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may prove mischievous.
The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives
all which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery,
after its enjoyment by the discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved;
and for his exclusive enjoyment of it during that time the public faith
is pledged.3
After quoting extensively from the Button Fastener case, Justice Peckham
reiterated that with few exceptions, the very object of the patent law is
monopoly:
SOld. at 83.
31 Id. at 89-90, citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 94, 97 (1832).
Summer, 1976]
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... Any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard
to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by
the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sale of the article,
will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts
keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal. 2
A very important and significant statement of the Bement Court was
that the Sherman Act "clearly does not refer to that kind of a restraint of
interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable and legal conditions
imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, re-
stricting the terms upon which the article may be used and the price to be
demanded therefor. Such a construction of the Act, we have no doubt, was
never contemplated by its framer."3 (emphasis added.) This is a clear estab-
lishment of a special rule of reason in patent cases.
Finally, the opinion states that "On looking through these licenses we
have been unable to find any conditions contained therein rendering the
agreement void because of a violation of that [Sherman] Act.""5 It is worth
noting that there was no dissent to this decision although three justices did
not hear the argument and took no part in the decision.
The Bement opinion makes it clear that the Court, with full appreciation
of the existence of the Sherman Act, concluded that:
(1) Monopolies are the very object of the patent laws. Therefore,
patents, as monopolies, are permissible monopolies not offensive under
the Sherman Act;
(2) Conditions which maintain the monopoly provided by a patent are
not illegal;
(3) A condition fixing prices in a patent license is not illegal; and,
(4) A patent rule of reason is applicable to license and assignment
situations.
The next significant happening in the development of license law was
the decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick,35 which held that
it was not illegal to tie the sale of mimeograph machines to the supply of
ink, stencils, and other supplies. The patentee sold the rotary mimeographing
machines, covered by the patent, at cost and made his profit from the sale
of the unpatented supplies. Justice Lurton asked, "Where, then, is the line
32 Id. at 91.
33 Id. at 92.
4 Id. at 93.
35 224 U.S. 1 (1912) [hereinafter cited as A. B. Dick].
[Vol. 10:1
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between a lawful and an unlawful qualification upon the use?""
6 He answered
that the question is one of statutory construction and the governing statute
creates a "true monopoly, one having its origin in the ultimate authority,
the Constitution." 7 He also queried whether the statute should be narrowly
scrutinized, which is "proper when a statutory right is asserted to uphold a
claim which is lacking in those moral elements which appeal to the normal
man. Or shall we approach it as a monopoly granted to subserve a broad
public policy, by which large ends are to be attained, and, therefore, to be
construed so as to give effect to a wise and beneficial purpose?"
8 The Court
never answered specifically this question, but the balance of the opinion can
only be construed as supporting a broad construction. For example, the
Court said that "Congress alone has the power to determine what restraints
shall be imposed. As the law now stands it contains none.. ."I' (emphasis
added.) The defendant in this case, and the minority, as will be more fully
developed later, urged that earlier cases should be overruled. The Court
answered that "A line of decisions which has come to be something like a
rule of property... should at least not be overruled except upon reasons so
clear as to make any other construction of the patent law inadmissible."'"
Whereas the Bement case was decided on a 6-0 alignment of the Court,
a 4-3 majority decided A. B. Dick. Due to the swing in philosophy between
1902 and 1912, and because the minority foretold the future of tie-ins, the
minority opinion and the reasoning exemplified justify careful study. The
strong dissent was written by Chief Justice White and he was joined by
Justices Hughes and Lamar.
One position of Justice White was that the attempted restriction dealt
with an unpatented material to be used with a mimeographing machine, as
distinguished from a restriction of the use of the machine or the duration
of its use. Under White's approach, it would seem that only elements of the
patented invention can be subject to any restriction; otherwise, the licensor
can extend the patent to an infinite variety of unpatented supplies. This
may be too fine a distinction. If it is a proper limitation to restrict the use to
which the machine might be applied, or the duration of the use, it would
seem reasonable to hold that the normal use of the machine was for ink-
printing. The minority may have missed the point that almost every patent
- and surely every machine patent - involves unpatented components, so
36 Id. at 26.
37 Id. at 27.
-a Id.
39 Id. at 35.
40 d. at 36.
ANTIRmUST PATENT LICENSE INTERFACESummer, 19761
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that licensing any such patent results, in some degree, in collecting royalty for
the sale or use of something unpatented. In an inventive sense, the ink was
part of the concept. The whole idea was to develop a machine which would
make multiple copies from a stencil with the use of ink. That the ink was
not an element of a claim in the patent does not detract from its necessary
presence in the use of the machine.
To return to Justice White's argument, he noted that the tied material
ink - was not covered by the patent in suit. He wrote, "This curious
anomaly then results, that that which was not embraced by the patent, which
could not have been embraced therein.., is now by the effect of a contract
held to be embraced by the patent.. . that a patentee ... has power by con-
tract to extend the patent so as to cause it to embrace things which it does
not include.. ." The challenge to this position is that the patentee in no
way claimed his patent covered supplies necessary to the use of the patented
machine. What he did establish was that a fair price for sharing his exclu-
sivity was the purchase of supplies from his designees, including the patentee.
A few paragraphs later, Justice White returned to his argument and
carried it forward, writing, ". . . the ruling now made in effect is that the
patentee has the power, by contract, to extend his patent rights so as to
bring within the claims of his patent things which are not embraced therein,
thus virtually legislating by causing the patent laws to cover subjects to
which without the exercise of the right of contract they could not reach, the
result being ... to multiply monopolies at the will of an interested party...,,2
(emphasis added.) The added element is the assertion that tie-ins extend
monopolies, an argument that has prevailed and spread ever since. The snow-
ball effect appears somewhat amazing in that no effort was made to show
how monopoly extension took or could take place. Earlier opinions explained
how this does not occur.
Rebuttal of Justice White's argument can be made on several grounds:
(1) No old market is foreclosed. The pre-existing market for ink is
changed in no way;
(2) On the contrary, the license creates a new market which did not
previously exist. It expands the market for the tied product;
(3) The most likely reason for the establishment and growth of this
new market is the competitive superiority of the patented inventions.
There is domination in this micro-area only to the extent desired by
the public which uses the invention;
(4) The restriction expanded - not contracted - the output of the tied
41 Id. at 51 (White, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 53.
[Vol. 10:1
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material, if as in this case, alternative ink and paper uses are not
displaced;
(5) Not all dominations are illegal. This was carefully explained by
Justice Lurton in A. B. Dick Co.,"3 and,
(6) Tie-ins can be metering devices serving to maximize profits of the
patented invention, more often than not leading to expansion
rather than contraction of sales, thus serving the interests of both
customers and patentees.
The majority in A. B. Dick faced up to the extension of monopoly argument,
which was the core of the minority opinion. They again used the Button
Fastener argument that the patentee created the market. If the patentee had
kept it to himself, no ink would have been sold by others. Hence, the
license restriction took nothing from others and did not, in any way, restrict
suppliers from serving their legitimate markets.
One difference between the positions of Justice Lurton and Justice
White is that the former justified his conclusion but the latter assumed his.
Justice White did not explain how monopolies are extended, and no suc-
ceeding opinion or commentary has remedied that deficiency. In addition, no
one following Justice White's rationale has explained why profit maximiza-
tion, economic efficiency, or success by reason of competitive superiority
are not sufficient defenses under the antitrust laws. Nor has it been explained
why tie-ins are not as reasonable as other permissible limitations upon use.
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS
One of the great issues today revolves around the interface between the
patent and the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice clearly takes the
position that there is no patent rule of reason," and if there is any rule of
reason applicable to patent cases, it is not rationally related to whether
the patentee gets his full reward or whether an unwarranted additional
"monopoly" is created. This view seems to have been foreshadowed by
Justice White. His dissent in A. B. Dick"5 includes reference to a resale
price maintenance case, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, Co.,
"
decided in 1911. According to Justice White, the majority treated the Miles
case "as inapplicable" because ". . . this case is one governed by the patent
laws, and therefore not within the rule of public policy which the Miles
43 Justice Lurton wrote the majority opinion in A. B. Dick.
44 Address by Bruce B. Wilson, American Patent Law Association, January 21, 1975; Address
by Richard H. Stern, Association of Corporate Patent Counsel, May 14, 1973.
45 224 U.S. at 49.
48 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Summer, 1976]
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Case applied..."'r Thus, the minority assumed that the Sherman Act
superseded the patent law and ignored any expressed rule of reason as in
Bement, the subsequently enacted Clayton Act"8 notwithstanding.
The minority opinion went on to set up a number of fanciful situations.
The majority felt these illustrations failed of their purpose because the
public was free to take or refuse the patented articles. If the terms imposed
were too onerous, there would be no market. The public would lose nothing
it had before and when the patent expired, the public would be free to use
the underlying patent in any way it chose. The larger right of suppression,
the majority felt, embraces the lesser of permitting use upon terms of the
licensor's (or assignor's) choosing."9
Justice White next returned to his monopoly-extending thesis by as-
serting that the majority, by permitting suit under the patent laws because
of plaintiff's suit for infringement, brings "... numerous articles of common
use within the monopoly of a patent when otherwise they would not have
been embraced therein, thereby tending to subject the whole of society to a
widespread and irksome monopolistic control." 0 Now we find the minority
of a Court, which throughout history has often drawn fine distinctions, unable
to appreciate the broad difference between the scope of a patent or the
nature of the patented invention, and a condition on which permission to
infringe was granted. The root of the minority's misunderstanding may be
revealed in the next statement of the dissent. It should be noted that one
of the main issues was whether, when a patent license is involved and
the suit charges infringement, the suit must be on the contract (in which
case the general law controls) or whether suit can be based on the patent
(in which case the patent law applies). The Court in A. B. Dick ruled that
the plaintiff may elect to sue for breach of contract or for infringement. This,
to the dissent, conflicts with many earlier cases which ".. . directly refute
the existence of a supposed right of extension by contract of the patent laws,
and are therefore, as I understand them, in conflict with the ruling now
made."
In the interest of brevity, the cases cited by Justice White in support of
47 A. B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 54 (White, J., dissenting).
48 Clayton Act §§1-26, ch. 323, §§1-26, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§12-27(1973) [hereinafter cited as Clayton Act].
49 This "part-whole" dilemma, identified long ago by Professor Thomas Reed Powell, works
in a discriminatory fashion against those who must license as against those who may license
themselves exploit the patented invention. See Powell, The Nature of a Patent Right, 17
COLUM. L. REv. 663 (1917).
5 0 A. B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 56 (White, J. dissenting).
a' Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1
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his position will not be discussed individually. They may be generally sum-
marized as suits for recovery of royalties not paid, failure to perform other
contract obligations, or determination of whether an act of Congress ex-
tending the life of a patent also extended a license to use the patent. The
Court, in an attempt to simplify, failed to distinguish between situations
where there was a breach of a contract provision and where there was an
unlicensed act. The legality of a license condition and a breach of a legal
condition are different questions. To be an infringement, there must be an
unlicensed act. To be a contract breach, there must be breach of a license
provision.
The remainder of Justice White's dissent returned to the scope of a
patentee's "monopoly." He complained that "... . since the decision in the
Button Fastener Case, the attempt to increase the scope of the monopoly
granted by a patent has become common by resorting to the device of license
restrictions manifested in various forms, all of which tend to increase mon-
opoly and to burden the public to the exercise of their common rights."
2
Finally, the following quotation appears to be the well from which anti-
trust supremacy - specifically whether patent licenses are primarily tested
by the patent laws, i.e., whether there is a special patent rule of reason with
respect to the antitrust laws - has sprung. It is of importance because
Justice White's views prevailed in the landmark Motion Picture case:
The contract, therefore, can only be maintained upon the assumption
that the patent law and the issue of a patent is the generating source of
an authority to contract to procure rights under the patent law not
otherwise within that law, and which could not be enjoyed under the
general law of the land.
53
Motion Picture presents another tie-in situation. Plaintiff's license for
the manufacture and sale of motion picture projectors provided that sales
by license should be on condition that the projectors run only film containing
the inventions of a specified patent. The condition was expressed on a plate
attached to the projector. There were also minimum price provisions. The
Court, with Justices Holmes, McKenna, and Van Devanter dissenting, held
the tie-in illegal. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co. "must be regarded as overruled."5 The rationale of the
majority was based on the views of Justice White (now Chief Justice), so
thoroughly stated in his dissent in A. B. Dick.
The first point of particular interest was that the opinion set up two
52 Id. at 70.
58 Id. at 71.
54 Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 518.
Summer, 1976]
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questions for decision. Both were directed to whether mere notice could be
effective to limit use of the apparatus. The decision and opinion were much
broader than those issues. The Court, for all practical purposes, considered
only the legality of tie-ins irrespective of how the condition was brought
home to users.
Since there was some reference to the notice, it may be useful to trace
the majority's "reasoning". It began with the patent statutes and observed
that the statutes made no mention of any such notice and decided that
whatever validity an attached notice has, it must be derived from the general
law - not the patent law. In the next paragraph, the Court stated that "the
extent to which the use of the patented machine may validly be restricted
to specific supplies or otherwise by special contract between the owner of
a patent and the purchaser or licensee is a question outside the patent law,
and with it we are not here concerned."55 This conclusion was not supported
or explained; nor was the opinion of the majority in A. B. Dick refuted
(the minority in A. B. Dick became the majority in Motion Picture).
The Motion Picture Court next set forth three "long established" rules
helpful in interpreting the statute:
(1) The scope of every patent is limited to the invention claimed;
(2) The patentee receives only the right to restrain others from making,
using or selling the patented invention; and,
(3) The primary purpose of the patent laws is to promote progress
of the useful arts and not the "creation of private fortunes for the
owners of patents."5
These generalizations are accepted by every knowledgeable patent lawyer.
In fact, these rules were so well established that there was no real need
for the Court to recite them - except as crutches to support the majority's
conclusion.
This allegation follows because Justice Clark went on to emphasize
that the statute and the three rules "restrict the patent granted on a machine
... to the mechanism described.., as necessary to produce the described
results. It is not concerned with and has nothing to do with the materials with
which or on which the machine operates... The ... materials with which
the machine is operated are no part of the patented ... results."' (emphasis
added.) The Court missed, or ignored, the reasoning exhibited in the earlier
cases. The statute and the rules mentioned go only to what exclusion the
55 Id. at 509.
56 Id. at 510-11.
51 Id. at 512.
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patentee can effect and what he can prevent others from doing. He can
prevent others only from doing what is claimed in the patent. This is not
the same thing as licensing others on condition that certain other things be
done or not done.
A license may be looked upon as a specifically permitted or excused in-
fringement. The condition is nothing more than limited permission. It does
not in any way equate the subject matter of the condition to the claims of
the patent. Permission based on royalty payments, never challenged in
principle for legality, is little different in effect from permission based on
the purchase of materials or parts. Both provide income to the licensor and
both aim at maximization of profits. Again, the Court stated that the re-
strictions of the law "... have nothing to do with the materials used in the
operation of the machine . . ."I This is another piece of the same cloth. The
allegation is sound only when the problem involves enforcement of the patent
against an infringer.
The Court again drags into the picture the argument that notice restric-
tions have nothing to do with the invention which is patented but relate
wholly to the materials to be used with it."9 In answer, it is impossible to
divorce a patented combination from unpatented components or supplies to
be used with them. A method claim necessarily operates entirely on un-
patented materials with unpatented machines (i.e., materials and machine
components are not part of the claim). Since the invention cannot be prac-
ticed without the use of unpatented materials or machines, the invention
obviously has very much to do with the patented inventions. Therefore, any
restriction, whether by notice or by contract, has a real connection with the
claimed invention; one cannot be used without the other. The patent claims
do not relate specifically to the materials used, but relate to the condition for
use of the invention. Finally, the tie-in of this case was not a restriction on
the use of materials but a condition on the use of an invention.
Early in the opinion, the Court referred to the protection accorded
by the patent laws to the inventor's "monopoly". There are many who
seriously quarrel with that appellation as applied to patents. It is not the
intention of this article to quibble over semantics. The problem involves a
legal right to exclude, and the earlier cases discussed above show clearly
that the vertical arrangement such as resale price requirements and tie-ins
can well be held reasonable under either patent or antitrust law. A rule of
reason is clearly applicable."
581d.
59 Id.
60 See W. BOMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973).
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The Court in Motion Picture lacked appreciation of the nature of the
patent right and the partial yielding of the exclusivity which is an important
part of that right. The Court, after stating that "the exclusive use of just
what his inventive genius has discovered ... is all that the statute provides
"61 predicted that if "... his discovery is an important one, his reward
under such a construction of the law will be large, as experience has abun-
dantly proved, and if it be unimportant, he should not be permitted by legal
devices to impose an unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of
it." But no rational explanation of an "unjust" charge is exposed. A limited
license is merely a means of maximizing the reward as recognized by the
Court. A tying requirement can, in no way, impose any charge upon the
public if the invention is unimportant. There will be nothing to sell if the
public finds the invention unimportant. The same is true of other vertically
imposed provisions.
The Court next asserted that "for more than a century this plain mean-
ing of the statute was accepted.., and that it afforded ample incentive to
exertion. ."I' This seems to be in flat contradiction to Button Fastener and
A. B. Dick as well as other precedent available at that time, and the majority
neither refers to this line of decisions nor explains them away. The Court
went on to stress how patent profits may arise without explaining the reason
for proscribing some and permitting others:
The time came in which the full possibilities seem first to have been
appreciated of... gathering great profits in small payments, which are
not realized or resented, from many, rather than smaller or even equal
profits in larger payments... and it came to be thought that... a patent
gave to the patentee or assigns the right to restrict the use of it to mate-
rials or supplies not described in the patent, and not by its terms made a
part of the thing patented."4
The materiality of this argument is not apparent. It should make no differ-
ence whatever whether income to licensors comes from a few large payments
or in bits and pieces. It makes no difference to a buyer or a lessee; surely
the total will be prorated across the entire production in both cases. The
"competitive superiority test," as a measure of patent reward, is thus not
met; it is evaded.
The Court next recognizes the Button Fastener case and its endorsement
of tie-ins and quotes the opinion in that case to the effect that the defendant
61 Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 513.
62 Id.
83 Id.
e4 Id. at 513-14.
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called upon the court "to mark another boundary line around the patentee's
monopoly which will debar him from engrossing the market for an article
not the subject of a patent; which it declined to do." 5 The Court noted that
Button Fastener proceeded on the theory that since the patentee possessed
exclusivity, ".... he must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any
conditions.., upon any use which he may allow of it.""
6 Monopoly extension
was here recognized as the central issue.
The Court believed that there was a defect in thinking which sprang
from substituting "inference and argument for the language of the statute"
'
and from a failure to distinguish the right which may be created by private
contract. This argument fails to recognize, as was carefully explained in the
earlier cases, that an unlicensed use (i.e., use outside the conditions of the
license) is an infringement, and therefore, within the scope of the remedy
covered by a suit for infringement. No explanation was offered as to how
the "inference and argument" of the earlier cases was incorrect. The Court
next "explained" that a patentee is restricted to use of the invention as
claimed and "not as it may be expanded by limitations as to materials and
supplies necessary to the operation of it. .."I Neither then nor later has
there been any explanation of how tying (or other use limitation) expands.
The patentee - it deserves repeating - is merely asking a price equivalent
for the right to use the patented invention.
At this stage, the Motion Picture Court returned to the notice attached
to the machines sold and held that "it is not competent for the owner of a
patent by notice attached to its machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its
patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its
operation but which are no part of the patented invention. .. "" The rule
of this case, then, is that such restrictions may not be imposed by notice.
Later cases relying on Motion Picture ignored the actual decision and applied
it to facts not involving notice.
The Court in A. B. Dick had referred to the Circuit Court's statement
that the patentee sold at cost, or less, and depended upon the profit realized
from the sale of unpatented supplies. In Motion Picture, Justice Clark found
this to be reprehensible. He said that "This fact, if it be a fact, instead of
commending, is the clearest possible condemnation of the practice adopted,
for it proves. . . the owner intends to and does derive its profit not from the
65 Id. at 514.
66Id.
67 Id.
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invention.., but from the unpatented supplies ... which are wholly without
the scope of the patent. .. "o Again, the wrong answer is made to a proper
question. The sale of unpatented supplies can be justified as a measure of the
use to which the machine is put. Again, there was no answer to the question:
how can there be sale of a certain volume of unpatented supplies but for the
patented machine? The profit, whether resulting from the machine or the
supplies or both, accrues from the worth of the patented invention.
Motion Picture is important for another reason. Between A. B. Dick
and Motion Picture, the Clayton Act was enacted into law. By its terms it
became unlawful:
To lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . machinery,
supplies or other commodities whether patented.., on the condition...
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use ... the goods...
machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract
for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.7'
The Court acknowledged that fact by stating that it was confirmed in its
conclusion by the passage of the Clayton Act. Interestingly enough, the
majority of the Court did not base its decision on that act, since it was not
applicable when Motion Picture was brought - a conclusion in which the
minority concurred. The Court summarized its decision by stating that a
restriction such as that involved is invalid because:
(1) The film was not part of the patented invention;
(2) There was an attempt to continue a patent monopoly after a patent
had expired; and,
(3) To enforce the condition "would be to create a monopoly in the
manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of the
patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.12
Justice Holmes wrote a short but strong dissent, in which he was
joined by Justices Van Devanter and McKenna. After supposing that
a patentee has no less property interest in his invention than any other owner,
and that he may, for whatever motive, keep his invention wholly out of use,
Holmes "cannot understand why he (the patentee) cannot keep it out of
use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, the buyer, will use some
70 Id. at 517.
71 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §14 (1973).
72 Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 518.
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unpatented thing in connection with it. Generally speaking, the measure of
a condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that consequence is one
that the owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it conditionally
upon a certain event.73 (emphasis added.)
The dissent recognized that there may be predominant public interest
which may dictate otherwise, but in this case, there was no such predominant
public interest. The dissenter's position reiterated the majority position:
The supposed contravention of public interest sometimes is stated as an
attempt to extend the patent law to unpatented articles, which of course
it is not, and more accurately as a possible domination to be estab-
lished by such means. But the domination is one only to the extent of
the desire for the teapot or film feeder, and if the owner prefers to
keep the pot or the feeder unless you will buy his tea or films, I cannot
see, in allowing him the right to do so anything more than an ordinary
incident of ownership...
Not only do I believe that the rule that I advocate is right under the
Paper Bag case," but I think that it has become a rule of property
that law and justice require to be retained."M
It deserves repeated emphasis that the majority in A. B. Dick analyzed and
explained what Holmes' dissent in Motion Picture supported.
The majority opinion in Motion Picture, no less than the dissent in
A. B. Dick, did not face up to their opponent's argument. Rather, they as-
sumed that tie-ins create monopoly beyond any justifiable patent exclusivity.
This early error has been refuted - but never corrected.
CONCLUSION
Patent tie-ins have become virtually per se illegal on the assumption
that they serve no purpose other than monopoly extension in inappropriate
areas, as if it were possible to refute the logic of Justice Lurton in A. B. Dick
by reiteration of "bootstrap" reasoning.
Professor Bowman has said, "One may begin to suspect that antitrust
is less a science than elaborate mythology, that it has operated for years on
hearsay and legends rather than on reality.""8 That opinion seems to find
ample support in the apparent overriding of the value of the patent right by
73 Id. at 519 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
75 Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 520 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76 BowMAN, supra note 60, at 49.
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antitrust principles without suitable justification.7 Ever since Bauer v. O'Don-
nell"8 and Motion Picture, the misconception has ballooned that many useful
patent contract provisions such as tie-ins create monopolies broader than
the patent. This is so despite the fact that no proponent of that theory -
lawyer or economist - has been able to show either that such a result has
occurred or could be expected to occur.
This is a time when the public needs, perhaps more than ever before,
advancement of technology and innovation. This is a time when one of the
most useful incentives to invention and innovation, the patent right, should
be strengthened and not further eroded. This is a time when turning back the
clock would be progression and not retrogression.
7 There is considerable literature supporting the application of antitrust principles to license
situations. See, e.g., Oppenheim, The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know-How
License Limitations: Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy? 15 IDEA, Spring
1971 at 1. The Oppenheim article provides strong support for a patent rule of reason at the
patent-antitrust interface. The author states:
First, preserve to the patentee the full reward to which the exclusive rights of the patent
group entitle him within the scope of the claims of his patented invention. Second, apply
the antitrust laws only when there is proof of, plus antitrust elements arising from re-
straints beyond the exclusivity bounds of the grant.
See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., pt. 2 at 505-06 (1971). For differing antitrust ap-
proaches to patent licenses, see Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966) (providing a far-reaching eco-
nomic study of licensing provisions); Kidwell, Patent Right Interchange and Antitrust Policy:
Defining the Interface, 43 CoLo. L. REv. 369 (1972).
78 229 U.S. 1 (1913). See note 6 supra.
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